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ABSTRACT: The main goal of the paper is to propose a methodology for the theory of reference in which experi-
ments feature prominently. These experiments should primarily test linguistic usage rather than the folk’s 
referential intuitions. The proposed methodology urges the use of: (A) philosophers’ referential intuitions, 
both informally and, occasionally, scientifically gathered; (B) the corpus, both informally and scientifically 
gathered; (C) elicited production; and, occasionally, (D) folk’s referential intuitions. The most novel part of 
this is (C) and that is where most of the experimental work should be. The secondary goal of the paper is 
to defend my earlier paper “Experimental Semantics” from the criticisms of Machery, Mallon, Nichols, and 
Stich in “If Folk Intuitions Vary, Then What?” They charge that I have seriously misunderstood their goal 
in “Semantics, Cross-Cultural Style” and that many of my arguments are “largely irrelevant”. I argue that 
these charges are baseless. 
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1. Introduction 
A group of philosophers, Edouard Machery, Ron Mallon, Shaun Nichols, and Stephen 
Stich (“MMNS”) have looked critically at the modus operandi of the philosophy of lan-
guage, the consulting of intuitions. They have noted that the intuitions consulted are 
nearly always those of philosophers.1 They have wondered about the appropriateness 
of this methodology. Shouldn’t the intuitions of the folk be considered too? Here they 
saw a problem. In light of some recent work in psychology by Richard Nisbett and 
colleagues (e.g., Nisbett et al. 2001), they predicted that there would be differences in 
the referential intuitions of East Asians (“EAs”) and Westerners (Ws) about Gödel 
and Jonah cases like those used in Saul Kripke’s famous refutation of description the-
ories of names (1980): EAs would be more likely to have descriptivist intuitions, Ws, 
causalist ones. They conducted some experiments on undergraduates in Rutgers and 
Hong Kong that confirmed this prediction in the Gödel cases but not in the Jonah 
ones (Machery et al. 2004). This raised a dire thought in their minds “about the nature 
of the philosophical enterprise of developing a theory of reference” (2004, B1; see also 
Mallon et al. 2009). 
 The standard intuition-driven methodology of philosophy of language, indeed of 
“armchair” philosophy generally, has long bothered me (1994; 1996, ch. 2; Devitt and 
Sterelny 1999, 285-7). And it bothers others. Thus, Jaakko Hintikka remarks: “One 
                                                     
* I am indebted to the following for comments on a draft of this paper: Ellen Fridland, James Genone, 
Steven Gross, Justyna Grudzińska, Nathaniel Hansen, Edouard Machery, Genoveva Martí, Jennifer 
Nado, Gary Ostertag, David Pereplyotchik, Francesco Pupa, Georges Rey. 
1 Max Deutsch (2009) is strangely critical of this account of the philosophical methodology. 
Whither Experimental Semantics? 
Theoria 73 (2012): 5-36 
6 
searches the literature in vain for a serious attempt to provide” a justification for the ap-
peal to intuitions (1999, 130). In a similar vein, Timothy Williamson remarks: “there is no 
agreed or even popular account of how intuition works, no accepted explanation of the 
hoped-for correlation between our having an intuition that P and its being true that P.” 
He describes this as “a methodological scandal” (2007, 215). So I think we should wel-
come the critical stance that MMNS and other “experimental philosophers” have tak-
en toward this standard methodology. I have found the challenge that MMNS have 
posed to what goes on in the philosophy of language particularly stimulating, as this 
paper attests. This having been said, I think that they are off on the wrong track. 
 My paper, “Experimental Semantics” (2011b),2 accepts that the results in the Gö-
del cases seem to provide puzzling evidence against Kripke’s refutation but presents a 
three-step argument aimed to greatly diminish the significance of the results. In par-
ticular, I dismiss MMNS’s dire thought that the results raise questions about the en-
terprise of developing a theory of reference. And, right as I think they are to question 
the standard intuition-driven methodology – see, most recently, my “The Role of In-
tuitions” (2012) - they are wrong to respond by testing the folk’s referential intuitions. 
The appropriate response to their legitimate concern about armchair philosophy is not 
to move in more armchairs.3 So I do not endorse Machery and Stich’s vision for the 
philosophy of language: 
[T]hat philosophers of language should emulate linguists, who are increasingly replacing the tradi-
tional informal reliance on their own and their colleagues’ intuitions with systematic experimental 
surveys of ordinary speakers’ intuitions. (2012, 495) 
 I have a different vision. My main goal in this paper is to present that vision. I shall 
propose a methodology for the theory of reference that does not abandon the role of 
philosophers’ intuitions but nonetheless gives a prominent place to experiments. 
However, the primary role for “experimental semantics” is testing linguistic usage ra-
ther than the folk’s referential intuitions. I shall start developing the case for this 
methodology quite early in pursuing my secondary goal. 
 In “If Folk Intuitions Vary, Then What?” (2012),4 MMNS respond to two critical 
reactions to their original paper: my paper, and one by Jonathan Ichikawa, Ishani 
Maitra, and Brian Weatherson (2011).5 My secondary goal is to defend my three-step 
argument from MMNS’s disappointing response. Apart for some constructive re-
marks about my second step, now called “the Expertise Defense”, the response is 
quite inadequate. Yet it concedes nothing. And it includes ill-based charges of misun-
derstanding and irrelevance.  
 My pursuit of this secondary goal begins in section 3 and continues on through the 
rest of the paper. However, my main goal about methodology is the dominant con-
                                                     
2 All unidentified references to my work are to this paper. 
3 I owe this nice remark to Genoveva Martí who thinks she heard or read it somewhere but can’t recall 
the circumstances. 
4 All unidentified references to MMNS are to this paper. 
5 Martí 2009 is another critical reaction, to which Machery et al. 2009 is a response. Martí also emphasizes 
the importance of testing linguistic usage. 
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cern of sections 5 and 6. In section 2, before pursuing either of these goals, I want to 
raise some doubts about MMNS’s initial prediction of cultural variation in referential 
intuitions. I think it unlikely that the puzzling variation MMNS have discovered shows 
us anything interesting about the use of intuitions in theorizing about reference. I sus-
pect that the variation is a red herring.  
 Readers who are interested in the main goal’s positive methodological proposal but 
not much in the secondary goal’s disagreements with MMNS might do well to skim 
sections 2 to 4 and focus on sections 5 and 6. 
2. Is Cultural Variation a Red Herring? 
We should start by noting that there is one popular view of the source of linguistic in-
tuitions that would predict no variation due to culture. This is the view, held by many 
linguists and to be discussed in some detail later (section 5), that a speaker’s intuitions 
about her language are derived from her underlying competence in the language; on 
this view, the intuitions are, as I like to say (2006a, b), “the voice of competence” 
(“VoC”). So assuming, as we surely should initially (at least), that Ws and EAs have 
same competence with names, they should have the same intuitions about them. So if 
MMNS held VoC it would be surprising that they should predict cultural variations in 
these intuitions. Why would they think that the findings of Nisbett and colleages were 
even relevant to those intuitions? Do MMNS hold VoC? It is hard to say because they 
are coy about the source of intuitions. Still the signs are that VoC is their view. Thus, 
what else could underlie the just-quoted passage about emulating linguists? A belief in 
VoC seems to be the only available explanation of the linguists’ special emphasis on 
testing ordinary speakers’ intuitions, as we shall see. If Machery and Stich don’t hold 
VoC, why would they want to emulate the linguists? We shall see other signs of a be-
lief in VoC later. Even if they are agnostic about VoC, that doctrine is so widespread 
that one wonders why it did not play a role in their predictions. 
 But, suppose that MMNS thought VoC false, as I will argue it is (sec. 5), should 
the recent work in psychology have led them to predict cultural variation between 
EAs and Ws in referential intuitions? It is hard to see why it should. 
 MMNS’s general inspiration from psychology is summed up in a passage they 
quote (2004, B5) that distinguishes two styles of thought: the “holistic” style of EAs  
and the “analytic” style of Ws. Yet it is far from clear how the quoted explanation of 
these different styles, or the more detailed one in the paper that is its source (Nisbett 
et al. 2001), would yield any relevant prediction about referential intuitions. And Gen-
oveva Martí (forthcoming) points out that one of the ways that this psychological lit-
erature distinguishes the styles of thought is as follows: EAs’ thinking is socially ori-
ented, Ws’, individualistic. Yet, as she emphasizes citing Kripke, the causal theory 
seems to make reference socially determined, the description theory, individualistically 
determined. So she wonders why MMNS did not make the opposite prediction. So 
too does Gary Ostertag (forthcoming), on similar grounds. 
 My wonderings are a bit different, prompted by the passage in which MMNS are 
most specific about the reasoning that led to their prediction: 
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One range of findings is particularly significant for our project. The cross-cultural work indicates 
that EAs are more inclined than Ws to make categorical judgments on the basis of similarity; Ws, 
on the other hand, are more disposed to focus on causation in describing the world and classify-
ing things (Norenzayan, Smith, and Kim 2002; Watanabe 1998, 1999). (Machery et al. 2004, B5) 
One can see why this might seem to provide a basis for MMNS’s prediction. But I 
have two problems. First, I can find no support in the paper, Norenzayan et al. 2002, 
for this claimed difference between EAs and Ws over causation-based judgments. In-
deed, causality is hardly mentioned in the paper! Where MMNS talk of Ws favoring 
causation-based judgments, the paper talks of them favoring rule-based ones. But per-
haps the paper otherwise supports MMNS’s prediction? My second problem is that I 
can’t see how it does. Ws’ rule-based thinking does not seem to yield the prediction of 
a causalist intuition about reference. And it is not even clear to me why EAs’ similari-
ty-based thinking yields a descriptivist intuition rather than a causalist one. I’ll spare 
the reader my reasoning. 
 Perhaps Martí, Ostertag, and I have missed the significance of this psychological 
work. In any case, it would be good to have a more careful spelling out than MMNS 
have provided so far of the bearing of this work on referential intuitions. 
 Of course, MMNS have something impressive going for them: they made a predic-
tion and it was confirmed! But if recent psychology does not support their prediction, 
we would be left with no explanation of the variation that MMNS discovered in intui-
tions about Gödel cases. The variation would be a genuine anomaly. Given this, and 
the discussion to follow in section 4, I suspect that the variation is a red herring for 
theorizing about reference. 
 I begin my secondary goal of defending my three-step argument from MMNS’s re-
sponse. 
3. Are MMNS Misunderstood? 
In their opening remarks, speaking of their critics, MMNS claim: 
[T]hey have quite seriously misunderstood our critical aim in Machery et al. 2004 and Mallon et 
al. 2009, perhaps because of one or two insufficiently careful sentences in these two articles. As a 
result, many of their arguments and just about all of their careful scholarship about Kripke’s 
Naming and Necessity are largely irrelevant to the project we were pursuing….most of Devitt’s and 
Ichikawa and colleagues’ criticisms fail to address our concerns. (p. 2)  
Later they claim that we fail to address their argument (p. 6). 
 This is very surprising. For, whatever their aim, I shall demonstrate that I addressed 
what they claimed and argued. And the considerations I adduced are very relevant to 
these claims and arguments. (I shall leave Ichikawa and colleagues to speak for them-
selves.) It is puzzling that MMNS feel so misunderstood. They have badly misde-
scribed the dialectical situation.  
 I start with the charge of serious misunderstanding which has two parts: I miss 
their real goal; I wrongly take them to have another goal. Sections 4 to 6 will address 
the charge of irrelevance. 
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3.1 Missed Goal? 
MMNS describe their real goal as follows: “Our goal is to challenge the way philoso-
phers of language go about determining what the right theory of reference is” (p. 3). 
Compare this with what I identify at the beginning of “Experimental Semantics” as 
one of MMNS’s “striking claims about theories of reference”, a claim that I just called 
their “dire thought”: 
(IV) The fact of these cultural differences [between EAs and Ws] “raises ques-
tions about the nature of the philosophical enterprise of developing a theory 
of reference” (Machery et al. 2004, B1); it points to “significant philosophi-
cal conclusions” (p. B8). (p. 419) 
MMNS support their present claim about their goal by quoting this very passage from 
p. B1! So where’s my misunderstanding? There may be one. I saw this passage as so 
dire because I took it to be not simply about the standard intuition-driven methodology 
for developing a theory of reference but, more boldly, about the very nature of the ref-
erential enterprise altogether. I took this passage, and the paper’s final discussion (pp. 
B8-B9), to be raising doubts – as Stich has before (1996, 37-51; 2009, 199) and Ma-
chery and Stich are about to (2012, sec. 4) – about the very task of explaining refer-
ence. In any case, if this is a misunderstanding, then, first, it is clearly not one that 
MMNS have in mind: they never mention it and, as we shall see in a moment, their 
complaint is that we critics took their goal to be less bold, not more bold, than it actu-
ally was. Second, it is of little significance to our disagreement: I certainly took them to 
be challenging the intuition-driven methodology at least. And the first two of the three 
steps in my attempt to diminish the significance of the cross-cultural experiment, pre-
sented as reasons for rejecting (IV), count against that challenge. (The third step 
counts only against the bolder claim about the very task of explaining reference.) So, 
no serious misunderstanding here. Misunderstanding seems rather more on the other 
foot. 
 Later on MMNS claim, on two separate occasions, that I grant their “most im-
portant conclusion”. Now if this were so, then I must have really misunderstood them 
since I present myself as disagreeing with them. The first thing to note is that their 
statements of their “most important conclusion” on the two occasions are quite dif-
ferent! One statement is indeed a conclusion of their original paper, but I don’t grant 
it.  The other statement, which I do grant, seems not to be present at all in that paper. 
I’ll discuss them in order. 
 One statement is, in effect, of their just-stated goal: “in light of […] the variation in 
intuitions about reference, the standard, intuition-based method for determining the 
correct theory of reference should be revised” (p. 12). I am alleged to grant this be-
cause I proposed a way of investigating reference without using those intuitions (on 
which more in section 6). As already noted (sec. 1), I have indeed long thought that 
we need to revise our methodology. But I do not grant that we need to do it “in light 
of […] the variation in intuitions”. So I do not grant their conclusion. 
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 The other statement is in the following passage, after quotes from my paper:  
[W]e wanted to raise much more general concerns about philosophers’ implicit endorsement “of 
the view that the semantic task simply is the systematization of our ordinary intuitions about 
meaning, reference, and the like” (p. 424). Devitt concedes that, on this common understanding, 
our findings do indeed “raise questions about the philosophical enterprise of developing a theory 
of reference” striking “at the very subject matter of semantics” (p. 424).  And this is exactly what we 
wanted to show. Our findings (if borne out by further work) suggest that the standard view of se-
mantics is in deep trouble. So Devitt agrees with the most important conclusion we wanted to es-
tablish. (pp. 8-9) 
So here MMNS take the most important goal of their original paper to be challenging 
the semantic metatheory according to which the very task of semantics is to study seman-
tic intuitions. But challenging this metatheory is very different from challenging the 
ubiquitous semantic method of consulting intuitions. We have already seen two quotes 
supporting the latter view of their goals. Here is another: “what we have been really 
concerned with is the method…: the use of intuitions about reference to identify or 
justify the right theory of reference” (p. 4). Of course, the two challenges are related. 
If the metatheory were right it would both justify and require the method. So chal-
lenging the method challenges the metatheory. But challenging the metatheory does 
not challenge the method. In any case, it is obvious that challenging the metatheory is 
not their most important challenge. Indeed, so far as I can see, the metatheory gets no 
mention at all in the original paper.6 Their most important challenge is to the method. 
It looks as if I understand their goals better than they do! 
 And MMNS should think that using their experimental findings to challenge the 
method is more important than using it to challenge the metatheory, for two reasons. 
(1) Even if we are right to suppose that many who follow the method implicitly en-
dorse the metatheory,7 doubtless many don’t. It is mostly hard to tell what philoso-
phers implicitly believe about the nature of the semantic task. And one can certainly 
follow the method without justifying it by the metatheory or, indeed, without justify-
ing it at all. (2) There are good reasons, aside from any experimental findings, for 
thinking that the metatheory is deeply misguided; or so I have argued (1996; 2012).  
3.2 Wrong Goal?  
So much for the charge that I fail to see what their real goal is. What about the charge 
that I wrongly take them to have another goal? One of the “striking claims about the 
theory of reference” that I claim to be implicit in MMNS’s original paper is: 
(III) These results raise serious doubts about Kripke’s refutation, which relies 
solely on the intuitions of Westerners. (p. 419) 
                                                     
6 They do briefly mention the Chomsky-inspired view that the semantic task is to give an account of “the 
implicit theory that underlies ordinary uses of names” (2004, B9). This is a different view of the task 
from the above metatheory but, as I note, it “may seem to be a reason” for the metatheory (p. 424n). 
7 What I actually say is that “philosophers…implicitly seem…to endorse” the metatheory (p. 424). I have 
recently been more cautious (2012, sec. 2). 
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MMNS now claim that “our goal has never been to challenge Kripke’s argument 
against descriptivism. Our project has a different and, we dare say, broader target” (p. 
3; see also p. 13). This is disingenuous. The broader target is the already-discussed in-
tuition-based methodology. Now whether or not challenging Kripke was their “goal”, 
their whole case against the broader target is made using Kripke’s argument as an ex-
ample of what is wrong with the philosophical method. Suffice it to say, any doubts 
MMNS have about the way philosophers of language in general “go about determin-
ing what the right theory of reference is” must, willy-nilly, carry over to their favorite 
example of such a procedure, Kripke’s argument. Claim (III) is indeed implicit in their 
earlier paper, just as I said. And, importantly, if they have failed to raise serious doubts 
about Kripke’s argument, as I argued they have, then they have failed to cast doubt on 
the philosophical methodology.  
 So much for the charge of misunderstanding. Turn now to the charge that many of 
my arguments fail to address their concerns and are “largely irrelevant”. As already 
noted, my argument proceeds in three steps. The first step points out that intuitions 
about Gödel cases are not of much significance in the intuitive support for Kripke’s 
refutation. The second step argues that we have good reason for preferring the intui-
tions of philosophers about Gödel cases to those of the folk. The third step argues 
that we should be seeking experimental support for theories of reference by testing 
usage not intuitions. I shall take them in turn, demonstrating the relevance of each. 
And I shall assess MMNS’s responses. For, although they think many of my argu-
ments are irrelevant, they respond to them. 
4. First Step: the Importance of Other Intuitions 
(III) and (IV) are two of the four “striking claims about theories of reference” that I 
attribute to MMNS. Here are the other two: 
(I) Philosophical views about reference “are assessed by consulting one’s intui-
tions about the reference of terms in hypothetical situations” (Machery et al. 
2004, B1).  
(II) [The cases of Gödel and Jonah] are “central” to Kripke’s refutation (p. B1). 
(p. 418) 
MMNS describe these cases as “some of the most influential thought experiments in 
the philosophy of reference” (2004, B8). And, of course, intuitions about those cases 
are the ones that they test in their cross-cultural study.  
4.1 The Argument 
My first step in diminishing the significance of MMNS’s findings is to reject (I) and 
(II). I point out that although it is certainly the case that some intuitions used by Kripke 
to support his refutation are about reference in hypothetical situations – for example, 
the Gödel case – many intuitions he uses are not of this sort. I argue, first (pp. 420-1), 
that the most important intuitions Kripke uses, in what Kim Sterelny and I (1999) call 
“Ignorance and Error” arguments, are about humdrum actual not hypothetical situa-
tions, particularly not fanciful hypothetical ones. These are intuitions about ‘Cicero’, 
Whither Experimental Semantics? 
Theoria 73 (2012): 5-36 
12
‘Catiline’, ‘Feynman’, ‘Einstein’, ‘Peano’, and ‘Columbus’. I argue, second (pp. 421-3), 
that key intuitions used in the “Unwanted Necessity” and “Lost Rigidity” arguments  
are not semantic ones about reference but metaphysical ones about modal properties; for 
example, that although Hesperus might not have been the planet that is seen in the 
evening it is not the case that it might not have been Hesperus. I conclude: 
Machery et al. leave untouched the referential intuitions about humdrum actual cases and the 
metaphysical ones about modal properties. These intuitions together are massively more im-
portant to the refutation than the intuitions about Jonah and Gödel cases that Machery et al test-
ed. And whereas their test of Gödel intuitions counts against the refutation, their test of Jonah intui-
tions confirmed the refutation. Yet, it seems to me, the Jonah intuitions are more trustworthy than the 
Gödel ones because the Jonah case is less fanciful than the Gödel one. (p. 423) 
 Now I take it as obvious that this argument, including its “careful scholarship 
about Kripke’s Naming and Necessity”, is very relevant to (III): if sound, it should di-
minish doubts about Kripke’s refutation that may arise from MMNS’s findings about 
Gödel cases.8 So, it should diminish doubts about philosophical methodology. So the 
argument is very relevant to MMNS’s goal, contrary to what they claim. 
4.2 MMNS’s Response 
Despite their irrelevance allegation, MMNS do respond to some of it. First, instead of 
(I), they now claim that “philosophers…typically appeal to the intuitions of competent 
speakers about the reference of proper names (or other kinds of words) in actual and 
possible cases” (p. 3; emphasis added; see also Machery 2012, p. 38). The change to 
include actual cases – the cases I stressed in my criticism - is welcome.9 But what 
about my other criticism of (I)? I point out that the intuitions that are brought to bear 
on theories of reference are not all referential ones; some are metaphysical ones about 
modal properties. They do not respond to this criticism.10 
                                                     
8 A further reason for doubting the significance of these findings about Gödel cases is that they concern 
the names of authors, which seem to have a double life. I mentioned this problem in a note (p. 428, n. 
9). In Designation (1981, 157-60), responding to Evans’ (1973) nice example of ‘Ibn Kahn’, I argued 
that the names of authors – my example was ‘Shakespeare’ –  have a double life, sometimes as a regu-
lar causal name, sometimes as an attributive/descriptional name like ‘Jack the Ripper’: thus it 
wouldn’t matter to the truth value of a critical assessment of some “work of Shakespeare” if the work 
was actually written by Bacon. So these names are tricky, seemingly covered by two conventions. 
9 They do not acknowledge the change. Perhaps they had (I) in mind in admitting there were “one or two 
insufficiently careful sentences” in earlier papers (p. 2). 
10 Perhaps the explanation of this is to be found in MMNS’s claim that they are “not concerned with ‘the 
strong theory-of-meaning construal of descriptivism’” but only with a weaker construal of descrip-
tivism as simply a theory of reference (p. 4). According to strong descriptivism the description that 
determines the reference also expresses the meaning. MMNS’s lack of interest in strong theories is 
odd since, so far as I know, all actual descriptivist theories before Kripke were strong ones. In any 
case, modal intuitions, which count only against strong descriptivism, have to be taken into account 
in assessing the relative importance of Gödel intuitions to Kripke’s refutation of all those actual theo-
ries. (I should note also that their claim that I “correctly insist that the Gödel case is directed only at 
the weak form of descriptivism” is doubly wrong: I don’t insist on it and it isn’t correct.) 
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 Now consider (II). Because of the important role of referential intuitions about 
humdrum actual cases, and metaphysical intuitions, I argue that the Gödel and Jonah 
cases are far from being “central” to Kripke’s refutation as MMNS claim. 
 MMNS are totally unmoved. Why? Their first reason is: 
Evidence suggests that some intuitions about the reference of proper names vary within and 
across cultures – viz. the intuitions about the reference of “Gödel” in the Gödel case. This varia-
tion inductively suggests that other intuitions about reference are also likely to vary. (p. 3; see also 
Machery 2012, p. 41) 
The variation does not inductively suggest this at all! Why suppose that a finding 
about intuitions in a fanciful hypothetical case will generalize to intuitions in hum-
drum actual cases (the only “other intuitions” that are relevant to my criticism)? I ar-
gue, in the spirit of an earlier Stich (1983, 62n), that intuitions about the former cases 
are much harder than those about the latter. If so, we should not expect this generali-
zation to be true. In any case, it is an empirical question that can be easily settled by 
testing the folk’s referential intuitions in the humdrum actual cases. I encourage 
MMNS to do so. I predict that no significant cultural variation will be found. 
 MMNS’s second reason is that intuitions about actual cases will not be sufficient to 
choose between theories of reference: intuitions about Gödel-type cases will be essen-
tial to that choice in the end. They offer two considerations in support.  
 (i) They rightly point out that, however successful Kripke is against a range of de-
scription theories, others can be proposed; and that coming up with a “full-fledged” 
causal theory that moves beyond Kripke’s “picture” is hard, requiring choice between 
many options.11. They claim, without argument, that “intuitions about possible cases 
are likely to be needed to determine what the correct theory of reference is” (p. 6). 
Removing Gödel from Kripke’s discussion would make hardly any difference to the 
effectiveness of Kripke’s argument. Why must it be any different for anyone else’s?  
 (ii) MMNS claim that intuitions about actual cases do not pose ignorance and error 
problems for two “more complex forms of descriptivism” that they propose. To settle 
the fate of these description theories we will need intuitions about the Gödel case 
“since [in that case] we can stipulate that everyone is mistaken” (p. 8). Their two pro-
posals are: “the reference of a proper name is determined by the description conven-
tionally associated with this proper name”; and, “by the description that experts in the 
relevant linguistic community associate with the name” (p. 8). Even if these proposals 
were promising so far as they go (which I don’t think they are), they don’t go far 
enough to be testable theories. For, they don’t connect the conventional associations 
or expert descriptions with the referential capacities of the competent but ignorant us-
ers of the name. Thus, I use the name ‘Bruce’ to refer to many people I could not 
identify. On any occasion it refers to one of those people in particular. How is one of 
the millions of sets of conventional associations or expert descriptions for the name 
‘Bruce’ brought to bear to determine that my reference on that occasion is to that par-
ticular person? I bet that a descriptivist answer to this question will fall foul of Krip-
                                                     
11 I’d be the last to deny the latter having written a book (1981) that attempts just such a theory. MMNS 
rightly draw attention to the many appeals to intuition in that book (p. 7). 
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kean intuitions about actual cases: ignorance and error problems once again (see, for 
example, Devitt and Sterelny 1999, sec. 3.4). 
 Let us take stock. What is at issue is the critical significance of the cultural variation 
discovered in the Gödel cases for the philosophical method of using intuitions as evi-
dence for theories of reference. My first step claims to diminish that significance by 
arguing that the discoveries about referential intuitions in a fanciful hypothetical case 
like Gödel do not reflect on, (a), referential intuitions about humdrum actual cases; 
nor on, (b), intuitions about modal properties. And (a) and (b) combined are massively 
more important to the theory of reference than intuitions about Gödel cases. In re-
sponse, MMNS claim, without argument, that the cultural variation in Gödel-case in-
tuitions is likely to generalize to actual-case intuitions. They claim further, without any 
adequate argument, that we will have to rely on Gödel-case intuitions in the end be-
cause actual-case ones will not suffice to choose a theory of reference. Both these 
claims are implausible, in my view. MMNS do not mention the role of modal intui-
tions as evidence. They failed to discover cultural variation in the Jonah-intuitions. 
There is no evidence of variation in the intuitions of philosophers. All in all, this 
strikes me as a very thin basis for the sort of general conclusion about cultural varia-
tion in intuitions that they need to cast serious doubts upon the philosophical method. 
The cultural variation in Gödel-cases is puzzling (sec. 2) but this is not the right re-
sponse to it. I suspect that the variation is a red herring for theorizing about reference. 
 I put a lot of store by this first step because its theoretical burden is small and it 
stays very close to the indubitable historical facts of theorizing about reference. 
MMNS are on very weak ground here. Indeed, I could simply rest my case against the 
significance of their findings with this first step. However, criticizing MMNS is only 
the secondary goal of this paper not the main one. The main goal is to propose a 
methodology for the theory of reference with a prominent place for experimental se-
mantics. The first step is little help with that. The second and third steps, in contrast, 
bear importantly on that methodology. The discussion of these steps in sections 5 and 
6 is more to further that goal than the secondary one. 
5. Second Step: “The Expertise Defense” 
One response that a philosopher of language might make to MMNS’s findings about 
folk intuitions is to claim that her own intuitions are superior to those of the folk. 
MMNS are scornful of this: it “smacks of narcissism in the extreme” (2004, B8-B9). 
My second step in diminishing the significance of the MMNS’s findings is to argue 
that philosophers’ intuitions should indeed be preferred to folk intuitions because phi-
losophers are more expert on matters referential (pp. 424-9). Machery calls this, aptly, 
“the Expertise Defense” (2012, p. 37).12 He and his team, MMNS, are dismissive of it. 
They find support in an important paper, “Are Philosophers Expert Intuiters?”, by 
Jonathan Weinberg, Chad Gonnerman, Cameron Buckner, and Joshua Alexander 
(2010). These papers make some good points against the Expertise Defense. 
                                                     
12 Machery also cites Ludwig 2007. 
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 Machery begins his paper in this volume with the claim that the Expertise Defense 
is perhaps “the most influential complaint” against a body of work in experimental 
semantics that he has co-authored. By the end of his paper, the Expertise Defense 
seems to have become the sole basis for my critical view of the original MMNS paper, 
the most famous part of that body of work: I am alleged to have argued “that these 
empirical results can be dismissed because experts’ intuitions provide better evidence 
about reference than lay people’s” (p. 53). This is a misunderstanding. The Expertise 
Defense is just one of three steps in my argument against the striking conclusion that 
MMNS draw about “the philosophical enterprise of developing a theory of reference”. 
It is not even the most important step. I think that the considerations in my first step, 
just discussed, are much more decisive than the Expertise Defense against that strik-
ing conclusion. However, if we are thinking not of the significance of MMNS’s find-
ings but of how the future should go in the philosophy of language, the main concern 
of Machery and Stich (2012), another of the papers in that body of work, and my main 
concern here, then I do think the Expertise Defense should loom large. For, the evi-
dential weight we should attach to the intuitions of the philosophers and of the folk in 
theory construction hinges on the effectiveness of this defense. So I will devote con-
siderable space to it. 
 Any assessment of the Expertise Defense is best guided by some theory of the 
source of intuitions about language. For our assessment of the likely reliability of lin-
guistic intuitions, whether the folk’s or the philosophers’, should depend on where we 
take the intuitions to have come from. My support for the Expertise Defense does 
rest on a theory. But before considering that theory we should consider another theo-
ry that counts against the Defense. 
5.1 “Voice of Comptence” (“VoC”) 
This is the “voice of competence” theory (“VoC”), popular in linguistics, that I men-
tioned in section 2. It not only counts against the Expertise Defense but also, as not-
ed, against MMNS’s prediction of cultural variation in these intuitions. I suggested 
that although MMNS are coy on the source of intuitions, there are signs that they hold 
VoC. I mentioned one sign: the suggestion that philosophers should emulate linguists 
by testing folk referential intuitions. Another sign is that VoC seems to be an underly-
ing presence in their dismissal of the Expertise Defense, soon to be discussed. If it is, 
then there is of course a tension between that dismissal and their prediction of cultural 
variation. And there is the problem that VoC is false; or so I have argued at length 
elsewhere (2006a, b, c). I shall summarize that argument in a moment.  
 First, we need to say a bit more about VoC. Noam Chomsky provides a nice 
statement of the doctrine: 
[I]t seems reasonably clear, both in principle and in many specific cases, how unconscious 
knowledge issues in conscious knowledge [...] it follows by computations similar to straight de-
duction. (1986, 270) 
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The “unconscious knowledge” is the speaker’s knowledge of her language, her linguistic 
competence, residing in a module of the mind, the “language faculty”;13 the “conscious 
knowledge” is an intuition about the language. Carson Schütze gives another statement of 
VoC: “the assumption that grammaticality judgments result from interactions among 
primary language faculties of the mind” (1996, xi). I have described VoC as follows: 
linguistic competence, all on its own, 
[P]rovides information about the linguistic facts […]. So these judgments are not arrived at by the 
sort of empirical investigation that judgments about the world usually require. Rather, a speaker 
has a privileged access to facts about the language, facts captured by the intuitions, simply in vir-
tue of being competent […] (2006a, 483-4; 2006b, 96)14 
Competence not only plays the dominant role in linguistic usage, it also provides informa-
tional content to metalinguistic intuitions. Those intuitions are indeed, “noise” aside, the 
voice of competence. That is why they are reliable. And if competence really does pro-
duce them then we have no reason to prefer those of the linguists to those of ordinary 
competent speakers. Indeed, we should prefer those of the latter because the linguists will 
be prone to a sort of noise that lessens their credibility: theoretical bias. 
 For Chomsky and the linguists, VoC is a theory of the source of syntactic intuitions, 
particularly those about grammaticality/acceptability.15 Stich has suggested that philoso-
phers of language might follow the lead of linguists in seeking a justification for the au-
thoritative role given to referential intuitions (1996, 40).16 He suggests that philosophers 
may think that speakers derive their referential intuitions from a representation of refer-
ential principles.17 So, just as the true grammar that linguists seek to discover is already 
represented in the mind of every speaker, so too, according to this suggestion, is a true 
theory of reference. Referential intuitions, like syntactic ones, are the result of something 
like a deduction from a represented theory. Thus, speakers have access to linguistic facts 
simply in virtue of being competent. 
5.2 Objections to VoC 
Someone who took the usual linguistic view of grammatical intuitions might well be 
tempted by this analogous view of referential intuitions. So, it is interesting to note that 
Chomsky is not tempted. He expresses skepticism about “contemporary philosophy of 
language” and its practice of “exploring intuitions about the technical notions ‘denote’, 
‘refer’, ‘true of’, etc.” He claims that: 
                                                     
13 Thus, Machery calls this “the modularist conception of intuitions” (2012, p. 41). 
14 The evidence that VoC is the received Chomskian view of linguistic intuitions is overwhelming yet 
some strangely resist the attribution: Collins (2008a, 16-19); Fitzgerald (2010, sec. 3.4). I have re-
sponded (2010c, sec. 4). See Sprouse and Almeida (forthcoming) for recent further evidence. 
15 Linguists tend to make too much of the distinction between intuitions about grammaticality and ac-
ceptability, in my view (2010c, sec. 1.3). 
16 Hintikka (1999) and Williamson (2007) make similar suggestions. 
17 Stich does not say whether or not he endorses the thought himself; that old coyness again. 
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 [T]here can be no intuitions about these notions, just as there can be none about ‘angular veloci-
ty’ or ‘protein’. These are technical terms of philosophical discourse with a stipulated sense that 
has no counterpart in ordinary language. (1995, 24) 
So Chomsky is skeptical about the use philosophers make of referential intuitions. But he 
is not, of course, similarly skeptical about the use linguists make of syntactic ones. Why 
the difference? If skepticism about semantic intuitions is appropriate, then surely just the 
same skepticism is appropriate about the syntactic ones, and for just the same reason. All 
the terms in linguistic theory are, in the relevant sense, technical and theory-laden. A few 
like ‘grammatical’ and ‘sentence’ have counterparts in ordinary language but so too do 
‘denote’ and ‘refer’. Semantic and syntactic intuitions are on a par. Chomsky seems to 
have given a good objection to VoC altogether. 
 There are other good objections.  
 What I call the “standard” version of VoC, implied by the Chomsky quote and by 
Stich’s suggestion, is based on the “representational thesis” that linguistic rules (and prin-
ciples) are represented in the language faculty. Speakers are then thought to derive their in-
tuitive judgments from these representations by a causal and rational process like a de-
duction. We are given no details of the causal-rational route from an unconscious repre-
sentation of rules in the language faculty to a conscious judgment about linguistic facts in 
the central processor. And we need details to turn this sketch into a theory. Still, the idea 
of one sort of representation leading to another is familiar and so this standard explana-
tion may seem promising. I produce several reasons for thinking it is not promising at all 
(2006a, 488-91, 503-5; 2006b, 100-3, 114-7). The most important objection is to the rep-
resentational thesis that is the basis of the explanation. A major conclusion of Ignorance of 
Language (2006b) is that there is no significant evidence that linguistic rules are represented 
in the minds of speakers and, given what else we know, it is implausible to suppose that 
they are.  
 Despite the evidence that the standard version is the right way to interpret VoC, it is 
not certain that linguists really do see intuitions as having their source in represented rules. 
And that implausible representational thesis is certainly rejected by many Chomskian phi-
losophers of linguistics (e.g., Smith 2006; Collins 2006, 2007, 2008a; Pietroski 2008; 
Slezak 2009). So, perhaps what I call the “nonstandard” version of VoC is the right inter-
pretation: the intuitions are provided somehow by embodied but unrepresented rules 
(2006a, 482-6; 2006b, 96-8). But this version faces an apparently overwhelming objec-
tion: we do not have any idea how embodied but unrepresented rules might provide lin-
guistic intuitions (2006a, 506-7; 2006b, 118). Not only do we lack the details needed 
for a plausible explanation, but attention to other similar systems gives good reason to 
suppose that the linguistic system does not provide these intuitions and so we could 
never have the details. The explanation would require a relatively direct cognitive path 
from the embodied rules of the language to beliefs about expressions of that language, a 
path that does not go via central-processor reflection on the data. What could that path 
be? Consider some other examples. It is very likely that rules that are embodied but not 
represented govern our swimming, bicycle riding, catching, typing, and thinking. Yet 
there does not seem to be any direct path from these rules to relevant beliefs. Why sup-
pose that there is such a path for linguistic beliefs? Why suppose that we can have privi-
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leged access to linguistic facts when we cannot to facts about these other activities? We 
do not have the beginnings of a positive answer to these questions and it seems unlikely 
that the future will bring answers.18 
 Since writing Ignorance, I have become aware of a body of developmental literature 
that provides persuasive empirical evidence against VoC.19 The evidence suggests that 
the ability to speak a language and the ability to have intuitions about the language are 
quite distinct, the former being acquired in early childhood, the latter, in middle child-
hood. Carson Schütze ends a critical discussion of much of this evidence with the obser-
vation that “it is hard to dispute the general conclusion that metalinguistic behavior is 
not a direct reflection of linguistic competence” (1996, 95). It looks as if VoC is false. 
 These objections were aimed primarily at VoC as a theory of syntactic intuitions. They 
apply just as much to VoC as a theory or referential intuitions. 
 If VoC is not the right account of the source of our metalinguistic intuitions, what is? 
Michael McKinsey gives one answer. He thinks that it is “fairly clear” that “the principle 
that the meanings of words are knowable a priori…is taken for granted by most philoso-
phers of language and by many linguists” (1987, 1). I think that he is probably right that 
this principle is taken for granted. But we can be confident that MMNS have no more 
time for the principle than I have (2011a). So let us set it aside. 
5.3 The Modest Theory of Intuitions 
In “Experimental Semantics” (pp. 425-7), I summarized another answer that I have given 
elsewhere (2006a, b, c; 2010b). I claim that intuitive judgments about language, like intui-
tive judgments in general, “are empirical theory-laden central-processor responses to 
phenomena, differing from many other such responses only in being fairly immediate and 
unreflective, based on little if any conscious reasoning” (2006a, 491; 2006b, 103).20 Alt-
hough a speaker’s competence in a language obviously gives her ready access to the data 
of that language, the data that the intuitions are about, it does not give her ready access to 
the truth about the data; the competence does not provide the informational content of 
the intuition. In this respect the view is sharply different from VoC. And it is sharply dif-
ferent in another respect: it is modest, making do with cognitive states and processes we 
were already committed to. So, following Mark Textor (2009), I shall call it “the Mod-
est Theory”. 
                                                     
18 Georges Rey strongly disagrees (2006, 562-7). I shall respond to his proposal soon. 
19 See particularly, Hakes (1980), Ryan and Ledger (1984), Bialystok and Ryan (1985), Bialystok (1986). 
20 How dependent is my view on a classical “central processor” model? Hardly at all. When I first intro-
duce talk of a central processor in Ignorance, I mention the opposing “massive modularity” model and 
set it aside claiming that any close-to-plausible version of it would not affect my arguments (p. 94). 
Thus, suppose that the locus of personal-level, largely conscious, theorizing about area X is (mostly?) 
in an X-module rather than a central processor. One could remove “central processor” from my ac-
count of intuitions in favor of “X-module”. (Note that although the language faculty may be a locus 
of subpersonal-level theorizing about language, it is not of personal-level theorizing.) 
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 The Modest Theory’s view that intuitions about language are “theory-laden” is im-
portant to the Expertise Defense and so needs explaining.21 MMNS take the view to 
be that these intuitions “are the product of people’s more or less inchoate empirical 
theories” (p. 9; see also Machery 2012, sec. 3.1). I put the view a bit differently. First, 
the view is not that these intuitions are theoretical judgments or the result of theoriz-
ing. Rather, the intuitions are mostly the product of experiences of the linguistic world. 
They are like “observation” judgments. As such, they are “theory-laden” in just the 
way that we commonly think observation judgments are. The antipositivist revolution 
in the philosophy of science, led by Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, drew our atten-
tion to the way in which even the most straightforward judgments arising from observa-
tional experiences may depend on a background. We would not make the judgments if 
we did not hold certain beliefs or theories, some involving the concepts deployed in the 
judgments. We would not make the judgments if we did not have certain predispositions, 
some innate but many acquired in training, to respond selectively to experiences.22 There 
is need for some cautionary words about this theory ladenness. 
 (a) The power of the background to influence judgments should not be exaggerated. 
Thus a person observing the Müller-Lyre arrows will judge that one “looks longer” than 
the other even though she knows perfectly well that they are the same length. (b) The 
view is not that we consciously bring this background into play in a way that amounts to 
theorizing about the experience. Surely, we mostly don’t. Nonetheless, the background 
plays a causal role in the judgment. (c) The view is not that we need to have done a deal 
of thinking about language before having linguistic intuitions: a thoroughly ignorant per-
son may learn to have intuitions in an experimental situation (2006a, 502; 2006b, 114).23 
(d) Finally, the theory ladenness we are discussing is epistemic. It should not be confused 
with semantic theory-ladenness, the view that the meaning of an observation term is de-
termined by the theory containing it. This “semantic holism”, also part of the revolution, 
has little to be said for it in my view (1996, 87-135). 
 The Expertise Defense falls out of the Modest Theory, as Machery nicely explains 
(2012, sec. 2.2): we should prefer the linguistic intuitions of linguists and philosophers 
because they have the better background theory and training. But the Defense is not 
so easy, as we will soon see (5.5). 
 I take it as obvious that this argument for the Expertise Defense, like the argument 
in my first step, is not “largely irrelevant” to MMNS’s project of challenging philoso-
phy’s intuition-based methodology. For, if sound, the Defense diminishes the signifi-
cance of cultural variation in folk intuitions for the theory of reference. MMNS’s 
charge of irrelevance is not looking well. 
 I emphasize immediately three things that are not consequences of the Expertise 
Defense. First, it is not a consequence that we can simply rest with the intuitions of a 
                                                     
21 I draw here on my 2006d and 2010b. 
22 So “theory” in “theory-laden” has to be construed very broadly to cover not just theories proper but al-
so these dispositions. 
23 I claim that this is the way to view intuitions of the ignorant in the ingenious “minimal pair” experi-
ments (2006a, 499; 2006b, 110). 
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group of linguists or philosophers, even less, with the intuitions of one or two lin-
guists or philosophers. These intuitions are open to test against linguistic reality, at 
least; see section 6. Second, it is not a consequence that the practice of gathering those 
intuitions informally is always appropriate. It would surely be better to gather them 
sometimes, at least, in a proper scientific way. Third, it is not a consequence that folk 
intuitions should never be sought nor that they provide no evidence (cf. Machery 
2012, secs. 2.3 and 4.2). Indeed, they may sometimes provide evidence that is as good 
as, or even better than, that provided by the experts’ intuitions. I shall say more about 
this (sec. 5.5). 
 However, it certainly is a consequence of the Expertise Defense that linguists and 
philosophers in the grip of different theories about some theoretically interesting cases 
may have different intuitions as a result: they may be biased. And false theories may 
lead to false intuitions: 
Linguistic education should make a person a better indicator of linguistic reality just as biological 
education makes a person a better indicator of biological reality. Of course a person educated in-
to a false theory may end up with distorted intuitions. But that is an unavoidable risk of epistemic 
life, in linguistics as everywhere else. We have no unsullied access to any reality. (2006a, 504; 
2006b, 115) 
Machery and Stich make much of the risk of bias, as we shall see (sec. 5.5). 
5.4 MMNS’s Response to the Modest Theory 
What do MMNS have to say in response to the Modest Theory of linguistic intui-
tions? Nothing in the way of argument. However, they do appeal to authority: 
As far as we know, there is not a single well known linguist who has endorsed Devitt’s critique of 
the “voice of competence” account in print or embraced Devitt’s alternative account. (p. 10) 
As far as I know, MMNS are right, but I wonder why they think that this is worth say-
ing. 
 First, linguists hardly ever discuss theories of intuitions at all, presumably feeling 
that they have better things to do, like constructing grammars. Indeed, they mostly 
seem to just presuppose VoC without even stating it explicitly. There seems to be little if 
any attention to the key epistemological question: Why are these metalinguistic intui-
tions good evidence? This is surprising given the importance attached to these intui-
tions as evidence in grammar construction. It is particularly surprising given the com-
mon concern about the evidential use of the informally gathered intuitions of linguists, 
particularly of just one or two linguists, rather than the use of intuitions gathered from 
ordinary speakers in a proper scientific way (Schütze 1996).24 
 The lack of attention may stem partly from the received Chomskian “psychological 
conception” according to which the grammar for a language is about a cognitive sys-
tem in the language faculty of its speakers. Assuming that the grammar is more or less 
                                                     
24 Thus, consider Sorace and Keller (2005), Featherson (2007), and Myers (2009). The authors of these 
recent papers are among those cited by Machery and Stich as examples of people who “have not only 
criticized syntacticians’ reliance on their own and their colleagues’ intuitions, they also have put for-
ward an alternative methodology: the careful survey of the intuitions of ordinary competent speakers” 
(2012, 497). Yet none of these papers raises the key epistemological question about these intuitions. 
Michael DEVITT 
Theoria 73 (2012): 5-36 
21
true, it follows from this conception that the grammar’s rules (and principles) are em-
bodied in a speaker’s mind. A lot of work still has to be done to get VoC, of course: 
we need the details of how the embodied rules yield a speaker’s metalinguistic intui-
tions. Still, it may be tempting to think that the embodied rules must be responsible for 
her intuitions, even sans details. Tempting or not, VoC does still need the details. 
Aside from that, this route to VoC faces a serious problem, in my view: the psycho-
logical conception is false. I have argued against it and in favor of a “linguistic concep-
tion” according to which, a grammar is about a nonpsychological realm of linguistic 
expressions, physical entities forming a symbolic or representational system (2003; 
2006b, ch. 2; Devitt and Sterelny 1989).25 It is then an open question whether compe-
tence in a language is constituted by the embodied rules of the language.   
 Whatever the reason for this lack of attention, as far as I know, no linguist has ar-
gued for VoC in recent times, nor responded to any of my arguments against VoC and 
for the Modest Theory. Philosophers of linguistics are a different story. Many have re-
sponded,26 but they have not, I claim (2006d; 2008c; 2010b, c), succeeded in under-
mining my arguments.  
 This brings me to my second point. This issue is not to be settled by appeal to the 
authority of linguists,27 or even to the authority of philosophers of linguistics; it is to 
be settled by argument. MMNS have offered none, nor even an alternative theory. Do 
they think VoC goes without saying? 
5.5 Criticisms of the Expertise Defense 
We are now in a position to consider the criticisms that MMNS and others make of 
the Expertise Defense. I start with two criticisms about bias that I don’t think should 
worry us. The remaining three criticisms are more troubling. 
 (1) MMNS are very exercised about theoretical bias (p.11). Thus, Machery and 
Stich claim that “syntacticians’ theoretical commitments risk influencing their intui-
tions, undermining the evidential role of these intuitions” (2012, 497). And they are 
quite right, of course. But that is just the sort of epistemic risk we always run in sci-
ence. It is the price of learning anything: “the innocent eye is blind, the virgin mind is 
empty”. Machery and Stich seem to hanker after the unobtainable: a bias-free world. 
Of course if VoC were correct then we could come close to escaping the epistemic 
risk in linguistics by consulting uneducated folk. Perhaps Machery and Stich hold 
VoC. But then they need to supply a good reason for doing so. 
 The Expertise Defense claims that we should, in general (see (3) below) prefer the 
intuitions of experts, despite the inescapable risk of theoretically biased intuitions. We 
                                                     
25 This rejection has received a deal of criticism (some of it very harsh): Antony 2008; Collins 2007, 
2008a, b; Dwyer and Pietroski 1996; Laurence 2003; Longworth 2009; Matthews 2006; Pietroski 
2008; Rattan 2006; Rey 2006, 2008; Slezak 2009; Smith 2006. Devitt 2006d, 2008a, b, c, and 2009b 
are recent responses to some of these criticisms. 
26 Collins 2006, 2007, 2008; Rattan 2006; Rey 2006; Smith 2006; Miščević 2006; Pietroski 2008; Slezak 
2009; Textor 2009; Fitzgerald 2010. 
27 Indeed, I think that there is a deal of confusion among linguists about intuitions (2010c, secs. 2-3). 
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should not exaggerate the likely effect of that bias. The intuitive judgments that scien-
tists, including linguists (see Sprouse and Almeida forthcoming), make about their 
domains tend to be in agreement. This is not surprising because the intuitions are not 
determined simply by theoretical background: they are determined largely, we hope, by 
experiences of the reality of that domain.  
 It is worth noting that philosophers who wanted to save description theories of 
names in the face of Kripke’s arguments did not reject his referential intuitions, 
whether about humdrum cases or Gödel and Jonah cases, but rather tried to construct 
description theories that were compatible with those intuitions (see Devitt and 
Sterelny 1999, sec. 3.5 for discussion). 
 (2) Weinberg and colleagues emphasize another concern about bias. There is evi-
dence that “non-truth-tracking factors” like “the order of presentation of the cases” 
lead to unreliability in folk intuitions. The concern then is: 
[W]hat the purveyors of the expertise defense require is that philosophers’ intuitions are suffi-
ciently less susceptible to the kinds of unreliability that seem to afflict the folk intuitions studied 
by experimental philosophers. (2010, 333; original emphasis) 
But the Expertise Defense does not require this. The Defense requires only that the 
philosophers’ intuitions be better, in general (see (3) below), even if just as influenced 
by non-truth-tracking factors as the folk’s. We assume that those factors do not alone 
determine the intuitions: background theory and linguistic reality play determining 
roles. So, the better the background, the better the intuitions. Similarly, the calls of a 
biased professional baseball umpire should be preferred to those of an equally biased 
fan. 
 We should, of course, always be on guard against bias of one sort or another in us-
ing philosophers’ intuitions as evidence. There are some obvious ways to counter it. 
Thus, where the concern is theoretical bias, we can consider the intuitions of philoso-
phers of various theoretical persuasions. This is in effect how Kripke’s intuitions were 
informally tested. And we can look for other evidence. This can be found in usage; see 
section 6. It might even be found in folk intuitions. For, to repeat, it is not part of the 
Expertise Defense that folk intuitions should never be sought.28 
 We move now to more serious worries about the Expertise Defense. 
 (3) MMNS think that the Defense lacks empirical support:  
[W]hile Devitt simply assumes that the linguistic intuitions of linguists and philosophers of lan-
guage will be more reliable than the intuitions of ordinary speakers, methodology-savvy syntacti-
cians have begun to explore the issue empirically. As we read this growing body of literature, 
there is little in it to support the idea that the intuitions of linguists and philosophers of language 
are more reliable than those of ordinary speakers, and there is some reason to think that they may 
in fact be less reliable. (p.11) 
 First, it is not true that I simply assume that linguists and philosophers have “more 
reliable” intuitions. (1) The Modest Theory predicts that the intuitions of linguists and 
philosophers will be better in their respective linguistic domains: briefly, the better the 
                                                     
28 One reason for seeking folk intuitions in linguistics, emphasized by MMNS (p.11), is a concern that the 
linguist’s idiolect may differ from the folk’s. 
Michael DEVITT 
Theoria 73 (2012): 5-36 
23
theory that intuitions are laden with, the better the intuitions. So my arguments for 
that theory and against its rival VoC support the prediction. (2) I offer some more 
empirical considerations in favor of the prediction from other domains and linguistics 
(2006a, 492-3, 499-500; 2006b, 104-5, 111). 
 Still, MMNS are right to demand more evidence that the prediction is right. But we 
need to be careful about the exact nature of the prediction.29 Although it follows from 
the Modest Theory that we should prefer the intuitions of experts in the area in ques-
tion, it does not follow from this that these experts will have more reliable intuitions than 
the folk about every fact in the area. It does not follow, for example, that the paleontolo-
gist who is better than the folk at identifying something as a pig’s jawbone will also be 
better at identifying something as a skull. Perhaps educated folk would do just as well be-
cause they have enough expertise. What does follow from the Modest Theory is that the 
more expert a person is in an area, the better the person’s background, the wider her 
range of reliable intuitions in the area. Turning to linguistics, the theory does not imply 
that linguists have more reliable intuitions about every linguistic fact: 
[W]e can often be confident that such intuitions of normal educated speakers are right. We often 
have good reason to suppose that these core judgments of folk linguistics, partly reflecting “the 
linguistic wisdom of the ages”, are good, though not of course infallible, evidence for linguistic 
theories. (2006a, 498-9; 2006b, 110) 
We should prefer the linguists’ intuitions particularly “when we get beyond the simple 
cases to theoretically interesting ones like ‘The horse raced past the barn fell’ and ‘Who 
do you wanna kiss you this time?’” (2006a, 499; 2006b, 111).30 The Modest Theory pre-
dicts that the more expert a person is in linguistics, the wider his range of reliable linguis-
tic intuitions. 
 There is an obvious difficulty in testing this prediction: the theory provides no 
guidance as to what level of expertise is required to be a reliable intuiter about any par-
ticular sort of linguistic fact. Indeed, how could the theory? The level required is an 
independent empirical question. 
 These subtleties need to be kept in mind in assessing the interesting findings of 
Culbertson and Gross (2009). MMNS cite these findings as evidence against the Ex-
pertise Defense (p. 11; see also Machery 2012, sec. 3.2). From the perspective of the 
Modest Theory, the findings are indeed a little surprising.  But given what that theory 
actually predicts, and issues arising from the vexed distinction between “acceptability” 
and “grammaticality” judgments, I argue that the bearing of these findings on the Ex-
pertise Defense is far from obvious (2010c; Gross and Culbertson 2011 is a response).  
 MMNS cite (p. 11) another experiment that is alleged to cast doubt on the Expertise 
Defense. It is another Gödel-case experiment (Machery 2012). The subjects were divid-
ed into three groups: Group 1, experts in semantics and the philosophy of language; 
Group 2, experts in discourse analysis, historical linguistics, and sociolinguistics; Group 3, 
                                                     
29 I draw here on my discussion of Culbertson and Gross (2009) in Devitt (2010c). 
30 The experiments I cite at this point, Spencer (1973) and Gordon and Hendrick (1997), though open to criti-
cism as Culbertson and Gross point out (2009, 727-8), illustrate the sort of non-simple cases where we 
might expect linguists’ intuitions to differ from those of the folk. 
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comparably educated lay people. The first thing to note about the findings is that the in-
tuitions of all groups were decisively Kripkean. However, group 1 was more Kripkean 
than 2 and 3, and 3 was more Kripkean than 2. The only significant result was the compar-
ison of 1 and 2. Machery has a strange take on this result. Noting that groups 1 and 2 are 
both experts about language and yet their intuitions differ significantly, Machery con-
cludes: “This inconsistent influence of expertise on intuitions about reference casts 
doubts on whether expertise really improves the reliability of these intuitions” (p. 50). 
Yet, of course, the two groups are experts on different aspects of language. What matters to 
the Expertise Defense is expertise about reference. We can confidently select Group 1 as 
likely experts about that. With Group 2, who knows? Their expertise in other aspects of 
language may well not transfer to reference. Consider the following passage, quoted by 
both Weinberg and colleagues (2010, 35) and MMNS (p. 10): there is ‘‘little transfer from 
high-level proficiency in one domain to proficiency in other domains—even when the do-
mains seem, intuitively, very similar’’ (Feltovich et al. 2006, 47; emphasis added). Machery’s in-
decisive results cast no serious doubt on the Expertise Defense and may even give it 
some gentle support. 
 All in all, as far as I know, experimental work has not undermined the prediction that 
philosophers have a wider range of reliable referential intuitions than the folk. 
 But does experimental work support that prediction? MMNS have this to say about 
linguistic intuitions: “Experimental work on linguists’ and ordinary competent speakers’ 
intuitions has not shown that the former are more reliable than the latter” (p. 11). Maybe 
not. And, turning to referential intuitions, there does not seem to be experimental work 
supporting the analogous claim about philosophers and those intuitions. It would certain-
ly be good to have some work. Here is a relatively easy way to get some.  
 We can probably assume that nearly all philosophers of language agree with Kripkean 
intuitions about Gödel cases; and Machery’s experiment, just discussed, supports that 
assumption. In contrast, MMNS have shown (let’s suppose) that EA folk do not 
agree. Furthermore, both EA and W folk “reveal considerable intra-cultural variation” 
in their intuitions (B8). So in Gödel cases we have a clear divergence between the philos-
ophers and the folk. If we could now produce evidence that the philosophers are right, we 
would have shown that the philosophers’ intuitions are indeed more reliable here than 
the folk’s. We can hope to find this evidence in studies of usage (sec. 6), perhaps even in 
folk intuitions about humdrum cases, that count against description theories and in favor 
of Kripke’s causal “picture” of names. 
 I think that theories of reference need evidence from usage anyway (sec. 6). That evi-
dence will be doubly helpful if it supports the Expertise Defense, thus justifying a prefer-
ence for philosophers’ intuitions over the folk’s. And the evidence is needed also to ad-
dress the following two concerns. 
 (4) Weinberg and colleagues (2010), in a discussion cited by MMNS (p. 10), draw at-
tention to some literature on the development of expertise. This does not challenge the 
Modest Theory but does throw doubt on whether that theory really does support the 
Expertise Defense as I have claimed. It seems that there is: 
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[T]remendous diversity in the development of expertise according to the characteristics of the 
task and the learning environment. Some areas, such as meteorology and chess, have proved 
conducive to acquiring expertise; others, such as psychiatry, stock brockerage, and polygraph test-
ing, have tended not to produce real expertise. (p. 334) 
So, is philosophy of language in the meteorology group or the psychiatry group? My 
hunch clearly is that it is in the former group. But hunches are not enough. Evidence 
of the sort just outlined would be helpful. 
 Even if philosophy is in with meteorology, MMNS have another worry, following 
Weinberg and colleagues again: 
[E]ven if it is the case that philosophers of language have a great deal of expertise about many as-
pects of natural language, it does not follow that their intuitions about thought-experiments con-
cerned with reference are more reliable than those of other speakers. (p. 10) 
But expertise in philosophy of language simply is an expertise about reference, mean-
ing, truth conditions, and the like. According to the Expertise Defense this expertise is 
the background for referential intuitions wherever they are formed, whether in a thought 
experiment (Kripke’s Gödel case) or not (Kripke’s Einstein case). 
 (5) Weinberg and colleagues have another related worry about the Expertise Defense. 
It starts with the following claim: 
One of the most robust consensus findings of the study of expertise is that expert judgments can 
only become more reliable where experts are readily confronted with clear, reliable feedback on 
which to train. (2010, 340)  
Weinberg and colleagues wonder “what, specifically, might that feedback be” in phi-
losophy? They contrast philosophy unfavorably with other disciplines in this respect: 
“Philosophy rarely if ever…provides the same ample degree of well-established cases 
to provide the requisite training regimen” (p. 341). They conclude pointedly that phi-
losophers are in the category 
of the mildly self-deceived, and at a minimum, these considerations indicate that proponents of 
the expertise defense need to offer real, substantive scientific evidence that this is not so. (p. 342) 
I think that they are right that we could do with that evidence. The evidence I have 
outlined would again be helpful. Nonetheless, we should not overlook that philoso-
phers of language are confronted informally by language use that does provide feed-
back. Thus, my Kripkean intuitions about names have been confirmed, day in and day 
out for forty years, by observations of people using a name to refer successfully to an 
object that they are ignorant or wrong about. More on this in section 6. 
5.6 Conclusions 
I have proposed the Modest Theory according to which intuitions are theory-laden. 
This implies that we should prefer the intuitions of those with better theories and 
training, the experts. However, the theory provides no guidance as to what level of 
expertise is required to be a reliable intuiter about any particular sort of fact. When it 
comes to referential intuitions, I predict that the folk’s intuitions may be as reliable as 
the philosophers’ about reference in humdrum actual cases; the folk are likely expert 
enough for these cases. In fanciful hypothetical cases, I predict that the philosophers’ 
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intuitions will be more reliable. Gödel cases are of that sort. That is the Expertise De-
fense against the significance of MMNS’s findings.  
 One way to undermine this Defense is to reject the Modest Theory. MMNS im-
plicitly do so, but without argument. 
 But is there any alternative to this theory of referential intuitions? Setting aside 
apriorism, the only alternative appears to be VoC. MMNS seem to favor this theory, 
and it does count against the Defense. According to VoC, the true theory of reference 
for names is represented, or otherwise embodied, in the minds of all competent 
speakers. Has anyone explicitly endorsed this view? In any case, I have argued that we 
have no reason to believe VoC and that it runs counter to the evidence that linguistic 
competence precedes metalinguistic competence in a child’s development. Further-
more, if the theory of reference were embodied without being represented, we would 
have no idea how it could yield referential intuitions. 
 Still, the Expertise Defense faces a problem. The problem is not risk of bias, for 
that risk is a feature of epistemic life in general and can be guarded against. The prob-
lem is that the Modest Theory’s prediction that the referential intuitions of philoso-
phers of language should be preferred to those of the folk could do with empirical 
support. The need for this support becomes particularly pressing in light of the fol-
lowing concerns: that training in philosophy may not produce real expertise; in partic-
ular, the training may not provide the requisite reliable feedback. The place to look for 
this empirical support is in linguistic usage. We shall consider that in the next section. 
 The Expertise Defense bears on both goals of this paper. It bears on the secondary 
goal because, if it is right, it further undermines the significance of MMNS’s findings 
of variation in the folk’s referential intuitions. But it is more important to the main 
goal because, if it is right, our methodology should attach more weight to the intui-
tions of philosophers than to those of the folk in constructing theories of reference. 
This would give some legitimacy to the practice of consulting only the intuitions of 
philosophers. Should we discover that the Expertise Defense was wrong, which I 
don’t expect, then there would be no basis for preferring the philosophers’ intuitions 
over the folk’s. Both sets of intuitions might still mostly be reliable enough to use as 
evidence but clearly this discovery would diminish the evidential value of philoso-
phers’ intuitions and increase the importance of other evidence. 
 One further thought on philosophers’ intuitions. At present these are seldom gath-
ered by a proper scientific survey. Nonetheless they are publicly aired in departments, 
conferences, and journals. Any that are not shared are likely to be challenged.31 So, for 
the most part, it is likely to be unnecessary to do a proper survey before using these 
intuitions as evidence. 
 The Expertise Defense raises interesting and controversial issues. Clearly its status 
needs to be settled. 
 Finally I move to the third step, the crux of my main goal to propose a methodol-
ogy for the theory of reference in which experiments feature prominently. 
                                                     
31 Colin Phillips (forthcoming) makes a similar point about the informal use of linguists’ intuitions; see al-
so the discussion in Sprouse and Almeida (forthcoming). 
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6. Third Step: Testing Usage 
I have talked of testing theories and intuitions about reference against “linguistic reali-
ty” and of doing this by checking “linguistic usage”. I think that this, rather than test-
ing referential intuitions, should be the focus of experimental semantics. I shall finish 
this paper by saying more about this. 
 A language is a system of representations or symbols, governed by rules, that scien-
tists sometimes posit in a species to explain its communicative behavior. Thus, lan-
guages have been posited for honey bees, for Gunnison’s prairie dogs, and, of course, 
for humans. The “linguistic reality” that concerns us here is the language in a particu-
lar community of humans. Each time members of the community speak the language, 
we have a piece of “linguistic usage”. What about reference? Referential relations are 
commonly assumed to be central to the nature of language. If this assumption is right, 
then theories of reference are central to our theory of a language. 
 If the referential assumption is not right – and Machery and Stich at least toy with 
the idea that it is not right (2012, sec. 4; see also Stich 1996, 37-51; 2009, 199) – then 
there is no place for theories of reference at all and hence no call to gather any evi-
dence about reference. If one does not make the assumption then one needs, of 
course, to explain language’s relation to the world in terms other than reference. Thus 
Paul Horwich (1998, 2005) has a deflationary theory of reference and proposes a use 
theory of language.32 In any case the referential assumption is a presupposition of any 
methodology for theories of reference. 
 Previous sections have been concerned with the gathering what is, in effect, indirect 
evidence about nature of reference: consulting people’s intuitions about reference relations. 
Yet science does not generally proceed like this. For example, we don’t mostly do bi-
ology by consulting people’s intuitions about living things; we seek direct evidence 
about the living things themselves. Similarly, I suggest, we should do semantics by 
seeking direct evidence about the reference relations themselves. How do we do that? 
6.1 The Corpus 
Reference relations are manifested in usage. So one way to gather direct evidence is to 
look at the corpus of usage. An example of what we can learn from the corpus is pro-
vided, unwittingly (and ironically), by MMNS themselves in the very experiment we 
have been discussing. Their own uses of ‘Gödel’ in a vignette designed to test description 
and causal theories of reference, are inconsistent with what (standard) description theo-
ries would predict.33 (As a result, the experiment is biased against description theo-
ries34 and so flawed in design.) Their ‘Gödel’ vignette reads as follows:  
Suppose that John has learned in college that Gödel is the man who proved an important math-
ematical theorem, called the incompleteness of arithmetic. John is quite good at mathematics and 
                                                     
32 I don’t think that this theory works (2002, 2011c). 
33 Similar remarks apply to James Genone and Tania Lombrozo’s use of the invented term ‘tyleritis’ in a 
vignette used in another piece of experimental semantics (forthcoming). 
34 Which, of course, adds to the puzzle that EAs were found to have descriptivist intuitions. 
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he can give an accurate statement of the incompleteness theorem, which he attributes to Gödel as 
the discoverer. But this is the only thing that he has heard about Gödel. Now suppose that Gödel 
was not the author of this theorem. A man called “Schmidt”, whose body was found in Vienna 
under mysterious circumstances many years ago, actually did the work in question. His friend 
Gödel somehow got hold of the manuscript and claimed credit for the work, which was thereaf-
ter attributed to Gödel. Thus, he has been known as the man who proved the incompleteness of 
arithmetic. Most people who have heard the name ‘Gödel’ are like John; the claim that Gödel 
discovered the incompleteness theorem is the only thing they have ever heard about Gödel. (Ma-
chery et al. 2004, B6) 
This vignette contains eight uses of the name ‘Gödel’ (and one mention). Now con-
sider the question: Who do these uses refer to? MMNS are the authors of this vignette 
and there can be no doubt that these philosophers are fully competent with the name 
‘Gödel’. And the referent of this name out of the mouths of the fully competent is to 
the eminent logician who did in fact prove the incompleteness of arithmetic and spent 
many years at Princeton. So that is who MMNS’s eight uses of the name in the vi-
gnette refer to. But then their use of the name in the following passage disconfirms 
the description theory: “Now suppose that Gödel was not the author of this theorem. 
A man called ‘Schmidt’, whose body was found in Vienna under mysterious circum-
stances many years ago, actually did the work in question.” For, if MMNS’s use of 
‘Gödel’ refers to that eminent logician in virtue of their associating with it the descrip-
tion, ‘the prover of the incompleteness of arithmetic’, this passage is not something 
that MMNS would be disposed to say. They would not, in one and the same breath, 
both refer to Gödel and suppose away the basis of that reference. Similarly, according 
to the theory that the reference of ‘bachelor’ is determined partly by its association 
with ‘unmarried’, competent speakers would not be disposed to say: “Suppose that the 
bachelors in Iceland are married.” But here the description theory seems to survive 
because we would not be disposed to say this.35 
 This is an example of how we can use the corpus to argue for/against a theory of 
reference. Of course there are difficulties in using the corpus in a scientific way. First, 
one has to note something in the linguistic phenomena that is evidence for/against 
some theory of reference. Then one has to have a record of it, which is problematic if 
it is spoken rather than written. And one may need to document quite a lot of infor-
mation about the speaker and circumstances. So my recent claim (sec. 5.5) of forty 
years of observations in support of Kripkean intuitions does not qualify. Still, it does 
illustrate what a mass of evidence the corpus provides that could be mined scientifical-
ly. And it indicates the important role that the corpus plays as informal evidence about 
reference.36 
                                                     
35 I once said much the same about Kripke’s case of Jonah: “Note that it is not possible, according to the 
description theory, for an earlier scholar to speculate, or to find evidence, that Jonah was a certain 
ordinary man that he, the scholar, has tracked down: that Jonah was the subject of superstitious sto-
ries; and so forth.  Such speculations and evidence cannot be about Jonah because they deny the de-
scriptions on which our use of the name depends. (1981, 19; see also Devitt and Sterelny 1999, 56). 
36 I made a similar point about the evidential role of the corpus in linguistics as part of a response to the 
tendency in linguistics to exaggerate the role of speakers’ intuitive judgments (2006a, 486-7; 2006b, 
98-9). 
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6.2 Elicited Production 
Fortunately, we don’t have to rely on the corpus for direct evidence in usage: we can 
induce usage from competent speakers in experimental situations. Consider this descrip-
tion of “the technique of elicited production” in linguistics: 
This technique involves children in a game, typically one in which children pose questions to a 
puppet. The game orchestrates experimental situations that are designed to be uniquely felicitous 
for production of the target structure. In this way, children are called on to produce structures 
that might otherwise not appear in their spontaneous speech. (Thornton 1995, 140) 
This technique is frequently used on children, partly because of the difficulty of getting 
helpful intuitions from them.37 Clearly much direct evidence could be gathered in this 
way. However, contriving appropriate situations in an experiment is likely to be a 
laborious business. 
 I proposed an easier technique of elicited production for linguistics. Instead of 
constructing situations to see what people say and understand in those situations, “we 
can describe situations and ask people what they would say or understand in those 
situations” (2006a, 487; 2006b, 99). Note that this is quite different from the much-
discussed earlier method of describing situations that include utterances and asking 
people to judge the linguistic properties of those utterances. The present method is not to 
prompt these metalinguistic intuitions, yielding indirect evidence, but to prompt linguistic usage, 
yielding direct evidence.38 Such a method has surely often been employed informally: 
linguists and philosophers ask themselves, and sometimes ordinary speakers, what they 
would say or understand in various situations.39 I don’t know whether this technique has 
ever been used experimentally in linguistics and I am quite sure it has not been in the 
theory of reference. The method could provide a rich source of evidence. It seems to me 
to be the way forward in experimental semantics. 
6.3 An Example of Elicited Production 
How does one go about testing theories of reference by this method of inducing us-
age? In “Experimental Semantics” (pp. 429-432), drawing on an earlier discussion of 
methodology (1994, 1996), I proposed one way for testing a description theory of 
names (although I did not describe it, as I should have, as inducing usage). I shall not 
repeat the details but the basic idea is to use qualitative measures to evaluate how a 
character’s association of descriptive information with a proper name influences what 
mental states people competent with the name will ascribe to the character. The Krip-
kean prediction is that it will make no difference to those people’s readiness to use the 
name in their ascriptions whether or not the character associates with the name an 
                                                     
37 See Crain et al. (2005, sec. 4) for a nice summary. 
38 The expression of a metalinguistic intuition is, of course, a piece of usage but its evidential role as such 
an expression is quite different from its role as simply a piece of usage (Devitt 2010c, sec. 1.2).  
39 I sum up my discussion of linguistic evidence: “the main evidence for grammars is not found in the intui-
tions of ordinary speakers but rather in a combination of the corpus, the evidence of what we would say 
and understand, and the intuitions of linguists” (2006b, 100). 
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identifying description of the name’s bearer. Wesley Buckwalter and I have begun 
conducting experiments in just this way on English native speakers. Our preliminary 
results confirm the Kripkean prediction (2011). 
 This proposal for investigating reference without using referential intuitions was 
the core of my third step in diminishing the significance of MMNS’s experimental 
findings. We have already seen that the first two steps escape MMNS’s charge of be-
ing “largely irrelevant” to their project. And so does this one if we take that project to 
have been the bold one of challenging the very nature of the referential enterprise. 
For, the third step shows that the task of explaining reference is still viable, whatever 
the concerns about the reliability of intuitions. So, far from many of my arguments fail-
ing to address their concerns, none did. I think that I had good reason to take their 
project to be the bold one (sec. 3.1). Still, perhaps the project was the less bold one of 
just challenging the intuition-based methodology of philosophy, as MMNS now say it 
was. Then my third step is indeed irrelevant, for it simply proposes a different meth-
odology. Even so, one out of three does not make many. 
 My proposal is just one way to test theories of reference by the method of elicited 
production. The success of the method does not of course depend on this way. 
6.4 MMNS’s Response 
MMNS make two brief criticisms of this proposal .40 (1) They allege that it is “really a 
bait-and-switch”: 
We are promised that one can provide evidence about the nature of reference without appeal to 
intuitions, but, when Devitt describes his method in detail, it turns out that it does appeal to intu-
itions after all, just not intuitions that are explicitly about the reference of terms.  Rather, the evidential 
basis for deciding between theories of reference is supposed to be mental states ascriptions – in-
tuitive judgments about other people’s mental states. (p. 12) 
I didn’t promise no appeal to intuitions. My proposal is to seek evidence in some lin-
guistic usage, in thought ascriptions. These ascriptions in response to a situation, like 
any immediate “intuitive” assertion in response to any situation, might be described as 
“intuitions” about the situation: I’m easy about the term ‘intuition’ (2006a, 491; 2006b, 
103). But if those ascriptions are described as intuitions then all the “observational 
judgments” of science should be so described. Intuitions are then unavoidable as evi-
dence. What is at issue is not the evidential role of intuitions but of intuitions about ref-
erence in a theory of reference. MMNS have missed the point.  
 (2) They go on: 
Furthermore, it is unclear that this alternative involves no appeal to intuitions about reference 
since ascribing beliefs or thoughts to others involves determining what they are thinking about.  
On many accounts, this amounts to determining what they are referring to. (p.12) 
Suppose that in the vignette a character Frank says, “Cicero was an ancient Greek”. 
Suppose next that the participant, Alice, as competent as anyone with ‘Cicero’, re-
                                                     
40 They also refer to Stich’s criticisms (2009, 197-200) of a brief (ill-judged) earlier proposal of mine for 
testing a theory of reference (2009a, 49-50). But these criticisms are beside the point as that proposal, 
with the role it assigns to folk intuitions, is quite different from the present proposal. 
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sponds to prompts with, “Frank believes that Cicero was an ancient Greek”. Simply on 
the strength of Alice’s competence with ‘Cicero’, theorists can reason from Alice’s use of that 
name in her response that Frank’s use of it in the vignette probably referred to the 
famous orator Cicero. This counts against a description theory. The claim that the 
mental processes that cause Alice’s response must involve thoughts about reference, in par-
ticular the intuition that Frank was referring to Cicero, is theoretically controversial at 
least and in my view quite wrong. But the important point is that we need take no 
stand on this theoretical controversy to use Alice’s response as evidence. It counts as 
evidence without the theoretical burden of any views about referential intuitions, 
about their cognitive roles, epistemic value, or whatever. That’s why linguistic usage 
like Alice’s is such good and basic evidence. 
 Finally, I wonder why MMNS are so unsympathetic to the idea of looking to usage 
for evidence. They are clearly very influenced by the debate about methodology in lin-
guistics. Though this debate is certainly dominated by attention to the role of intui-
tions as evidence – far too much so, in my view (2006a, 486-7; 2006b, 98-9) – the role 
of the corpus as evidence is usually acknowledged, even if only in passing: it is 
acknowledged for example in Featherston 2007 and Myers 2009. And the idea of get-
ting evidence from elicited production has a respectable place in linguistics.41 So it is 
curious that, in theorizing about reference, MMNS focus all their energy on testing in-
tuitions and never even mention looking to the corpus or testing usage. 
6.5 The Methodological Proposal 
My main goal in this paper was to propose a methodology for the theory of reference 
in which experiments feature prominently. I am now in a position to do so. 
 (a) Philosophers’ Referential Intuitions: The received methodology includes the informal 
testing of theories against philosophers’ intuitions. If the Expertise Defense is right, 
then those intuitions are likely to be reliable and so it is appropriate that they should 
have an evidential role. Doubtless it would sometimes be appropriate to survey these 
intuitions scientifically but, given how publicly these intuitions are typically aired, this 
may not be necessary often.42 Even if the Expertise Defense is right, the evidential 
value of these intuitions does not match that from (B) and (C) below. And, if the De-
fense should turn out to be wrong, the value of these intuitions would be greatly di-
minished although not eliminated. 
 (b) The Corpus: I suspect that the present methodology also includes much informal 
testing of theories against philosophers’ observations of language use, observations of 
the corpus; for example, observations of the ignorant successfully referring with a 
                                                     
41 All the items mentioned (as well as reaction time studies, eye tracking, and electromagnetic brain poten-
tials) are mentioned by Manfred Krifka (forthcoming) in a helpful summary of the evidence that lin-
guists use in semantics. 
42 “Though it is relatively common to assume that formal experiments provide ‘better’ results than infor-
mal results, the current state of the field suggests that many of the perceived benefits of formal exper-
iments ultimately disappear under closer empirical scrutiny.” (Sprouse and Almeida forthcoming) 
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name. We should add to this informal practice the systematic and scientific study of 
the corpus for evidence. 
 (c) Elicited Production: The most novel part of my proposal is that we should induce 
linguistic usage from competent speakers to test theories. This could be done by con-
structing situations to see what people say and understand in those situations, but it is far 
easier to describe situations and ask people what they say or understand about those situ-
ations. I have provided an example of how we might go about doing this. 
 (d) Folk’s Referential Intuitions: Finally, there is surely some place for the scientific sur-
veying of the folk’s intuitions, pioneered by MMNS. However, I think that it is a relative-
ly small place. There is a point to surveying folk rather than more expert philosophers on-
ly in the rather unlikely circumstance that there is no other way of guarding against theo-
retical bias (or if there is concern that the folk have a referentially different idiolect). Even 
if the Expertise Defense turned out to be wrong, I suspect that wherever it might other-
wise seem appropriate to test folk intuitions it would be better to seek direct evidence in 
folk usage. 
7. Conclusions 
“Experimental Semantics” offered a three-step argument aimed to greatly diminish the 
significance of the findings in MMNS’s original paper. In response they claim that I 
have seriously misunderstood their goal and that many of my arguments are “largely 
irrelevant”. They concede nothing. The secondary goal of my paper has been to de-
fend my argument from this disappointing response. 
 But the paper starts by raising some doubts about MMNS’s prediction of cultural 
variation in referential intuitions. It is hard to see how the recent psychological work 
that is alleged to support this prediction really does support it (sec. 2). 
 In response to the charge of misunderstanding, I have argued that, except perhaps 
in one respect that MMNS do not have in mind, taking their goal to be a bit bolder 
than it was, I understood their goal well (sec. 3). As to the charge of irrelevance, my 
first two steps are obviously relevant to their goal and the third is relevant if their goal 
was the bolder one (secs. 4-6). Their charges seem baseless. 
 Despite the alleged irrelevance of my arguments, MMNS do respond to them. My 
first step argued that the referential intuitions about Gödel cases that MMNS tested 
are relatively insignificant in Kripke’s argument against description theories: the com-
bination of referential intuitions about humdrum cases and modal intuitions are mas-
sively more significant. In response, MMNS claim, implausibly and largely without ar-
gument, that the cultural variation in Gödel-case intuitions is likely to generalize to ac-
tual-case intuitions; and that we will have to rely on Gödel-case intuitions in the end 
because actual-case ones will not suffice to choose a theory of reference. MMNS are 
on such weak ground here that I could rest my case against the significance of their 
findings with this first step (sec. 4).  
 In light of this discussion and doubts that the psychological work predicts cultural 
variation in referential intuitions, I suspect that the variation in Gödel-case intuitions 
is a red herring. 
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 My main goal in the paper is to propose a methodology for the theory of reference 
in which experiments feature prominently. The relative place of philosophers’ referen-
tial intuitions in this methodology depends on the Expertise Defense. If the Defense 
is right, we should attach more weight to the intuitions of philosophers than to those 
of the folk in constructing theories of reference. And if it is right, it further under-
mines the significance of MMNS’s findings of variation in the folk’s referential intui-
tions. My second step argued that the Defense is right. MMNS and others have shown 
that this claim needs more empirical support (sec. 5).  
 Finally, I have argued for testing usage as central to the methodology. I suspect 
that theories are already being informally tested by observations of the corpus and 
recommend that we should add to this some systematic and scientific study of the 
corpus. My most novel proposal is that we should use the technique of elicited pro-
duction to test usage: we should conduct experiments in which situations are described 
and people are prompted to see what they say and understand in those situations. Finally, 
I propose a small place for the scientific surveying of the folk’s referential intuitions (sec. 
6). 
 In sum, I am urging a methodology that uses: (A) philosophers’ referential intui-
tions, both informally and, occasionally, scientifically gathered; (B) the corpus, both in-
formally and scientifically gathered; (C) elicited production; and, occasionally, (D) 
folk’s referential intuitions. The most novel part of this is (C) and that is where most of 
the experimental work should be. 
 The philosophical tradition is to base semantic theories on philosophers’ intuitions. 
MMNS go along with the traditional focus on intuitions as evidence but add folk intu-
itions to the mix. This is the wrong way for experimental semantics to go. What is 
needed is a different evidential focus: the testing of usage. 
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